As the incoming administration prepares to tackle its key foreign policy priorities, one issue is likely to generate heated debate: what to do about Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan autocrat who only six months ago brazenly stole a presidential election that he lost by a 2 to 1 ratio.  Unsurprisingly, calls have already emerged for a return to the maximum pressure approach of the first Trump term, which imposed harsh economic sanctions on Venezuela. Some voices are even urging the incoming president to go further — Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe recently called for a military intervention to remove Maduro by force, a stance that was echoed by Venezuelan political leaders and American commentators. But let’s face it: The United States is not going to invade Venezuela — or Panama or Greenland, for that matter. There is little appetite among the American public — and even less among MAGA-supporting Republicans — for a military adventure that would likely require the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers, possibly for a prolonged period.  That’s a good thing, considering the disastrous history of U.S. military interventions. Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq are just a few testaments to these failures. A return to the maximum pressure approach of reimposing punitive economic sanctions on the country’s economy would also be a grave mistake. It would do nothing more than punish millions of Venezuelans who should not bear the burden for Maduro’s atrocities.  Moreover, it would directly conflict with one of the incoming administration’s most pressing goals: curbing the increasing flow of irregular migrants, a sizable and growing fraction of whom are Venezuelans, arriving at the U.S. border. Over the past two years, the Biden administration eased some sanctions on Venezuela, allowing Chevron and other selected companies to engage in the Venezuelan oil sector. Hardline groups within the Venezuelan opposition, accompanied by U.S. foreign policy hawks, are now calling for an end to these licenses, arguing that the resulting revenue flows benefit Maduro.  However, their simplistic argument does not withstand scrutiny. Evidence shows that U.S. sanctions significantly contributed to Venezuela’s economic implosion, while the easing of sanctions in recent years has been associated with a moderate economic recovery that has helped alleviate the worst of the country’s economic crisis. In a recent research paper, I analyzed the impact of alternative sanctions policy scenarios on Venezuelan migration flows. Drawing on earlier research, I estimated that reinstating maximum pressure sanctions would result in an estimated 1 million additional Venezuelans immigrating over the next five years compared to a baseline scenario of no economic sanctions.  If the U.S. aims to alleviate Venezuela’s migration exodus, it should focus on relaxing, rather than tightening, sanctions on the South American country. A return to maximum pressure sanctions would amount to nothing more than a repetition of one of the most acute policy failures of the first Trump administration. Over the last decade, Venezuela’s per capita income fell by 71 percent — the equivalent of three consecutive Great Depressions and the largest documented peacetime economic contraction in world history.  In “The Collapse of Venezuela,” my forthcoming book, I show that U.S. economic sanctions significantly contributed to the country’s economic implosion, accounting for more than 52 percent of the collapse in GDP. In my more recent research, I estimate that had it not been for U.S. economic sanctions, approximately 4 million Venezuelans would have chosen to stay in their country rather than flee abroad. Milton Friedman once wrote that economic sanctions are not an effective weapon of political warfare because they are likely to harm the imposer as much as the intended target. The Venezuelan case provides a compelling example. Rather than weaken Maduro, sanctions have strengthened his position, enabling his concentration of power and consolidation of ties with America’s adversaries. As U.S. companies have exited Venezuela, they have been replaced by actors from China, Russia and Iran, further entrenching Maduro’s regime and reducing U.S. influence in the region. Opponents of easing sanctions argue that pressure on Nicolás Maduro is necessary to drive him from power, but decades of research show sanctions rarely achieve regime change. Instead, they often strengthen authoritarian regimes by providing a scapegoat for economic mismanagement and rallying nationalist sentiment. Maintaining or tightening sanctions undermines U.S. migration and foreign policy goals. Cooperation with origin countries like Venezuela is essential to addressing irregular migration, yet sanctions poison diplomatic relations and isolate the U.S. internationally. Key allies, including the European Union, have avoided imposing economic sanctions on Venezuela, explicitly stating that they will not contribute to exacerbating Venezuela’s economic and humanitarian crisis. It should be the U.S., not Europe, taking the lead in prioritizing the well-being of Venezuelans and putting humanitarian considerations at the forefront of its policy strategies. Venezuelans are not leaving their homeland because of abstract political grievances; they are fleeing hunger, poverty and hopelessness. The new administration has a chance to address these root causes and chart a course that aligns U.S. policy with its professed commitment to alleviating human suffering. It’s an opportunity that must not be missed. Francisco Rodríguez is the Rice Family Professor of the Practice of International and Public Affairs at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He is the author of “The Collapse of Venezuela: Scorched Earth Politics and Economic Decline, 2012-2020.”