Does Russia’s president know that his “special military operation” against Ukraine has turned into disaster for Russia? Or does he really think that he’s winning? Russia has failed to reach its intended goals — the so-called “de-Nazification” of Ukraine and its transformation into a demilitarized Russian vassal. In fact, the exact opposite has occurred. Ukraine remains firmly committed to democracy and sovereignty. Ukrainians have become intensely patriotic and anti-Russian. Their armed forces are now arguably Europe’s best, having managed to keep Russia’s army at bay for three years. Worse, Russia has suffered more than 800,000 dead or wounded, and at the current rate of attrition — roughly 1,500 per day — it will soon approach a million. Thousands of Russian tanks, artillery systems and aircraft have been destroyed. Russia’s refineries, gas, petroleum and ammunition depots and critical infrastructure are being systematically degraded, forcing Moscow to rely on North Korea for weapons and soldiers. Parts of Kursk Province are still occupied by Ukrainians, and the Russian economy is headed for a disastrous performance in 2025, as even Russian officials acknowledge. Things are no less critical on the international front. Sanctions have crippled certain Russian economic sectors, NATO has expanded to include Finland and Sweden and is making serious noises about admitting Ukraine, Syria’s pro-Russia dictatorial regime has fallen, Iran has been crippled and China has effectively become Russia’s lord and master. None of this looks like winning. Indeed, it looks like losing. And yet Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to assert that all is going well. There are three possible explanations for his bravado. First, he could be lying, as he, like so many politicians, is wont to do. Conditions are terrible and there’s no one you can blame for the disastrous state of affairs. So, obviously, you pretend that retreat is advance and that defeat is victory. Soviet and Russian policymakers, not to mention agents of the secret police such as Putin, were especially adept at constructing Potemkin villages that created the illusion of normality amid death and destruction. Lying has its pitfalls, as it assumes that the public is too foolish to see the reality around it — legless soldiers, rampant inflation and the like. But Putin may not care whether his lies are believed. He may, like the late Soviet leadership, be concerned only with telling people what to say in public, so as to reinforce the Potemkin illusion. Second, it is possible that Putin doesn’t know the true extent of the damage the war has wrought. Having constructed a “power vertical” with himself at the apex, he has almost certainly become victim of his own over-centralized systemic designs. Typically, in such systems, underlings have a strong incentive to sugarcoat bad news as it moves up the ladder. Outright falsification and padding were typical of the Soviet system Putin knew so well. As a result, he may be reading reports and getting advice that paint a far rosier picture than the reality merits. If Putin’s perceptions of reality deviate too much from the actual reality, he will obviously and inevitably make serious errors of judgment that could, either individually or cumulatively, result in disaster. His fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 is arguably is one such instance, especially since he truly appears to have believed the invasion would be a cakewalk. Third, Putin could be deluded, living in a parallel universe of his own, in which whatever he believes is true must be true. This would not be the first time a tyrant was so psychologically unbalanced and solipsistic in his regard of the world. Naturally, a deranged Russian leader, especially one armed with nuclear weapons, would be bad news for Russia, but also for Ukraine and the world. That Putin permits his sidekick Dmitri Medvedev to regularly threaten the West with incineration may suggest that the delusional explanation is not as outlandish as it at first appears. What does this analysis imply for possible future negotiations with Russia? That Putin will play it tough, insisting that he has the upper hand. But his interlocutors should not be impressed. They will have to play it even tougher. Unfortunately, any hope of progress will require Putin to admit to Russia’s weakness. That won’t be easy, as it will require Putin admitting that he’s a liar or has been lied to — in other words, that he is weak. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”