3 nonnegotiables in the quest for peace in Ukraine
Dec 27, 2024
President-elect Trump has vowed to end the war in Ukraine “within a day” of returning to the White House, or perhaps even before. Early indicators suggest he may just pull it off — or, at least, that peace may be coming into view.
For the first time since Russia’s confiscation of Ukrainian territory in 2014 and its subsequent full invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has signaled he’ll consider giving land to get peace under specific circumstances. Namely, Zelensky may be ready to concede territory if NATO extends protection to the parts of Ukraine under Kyiv’s control.
A template for ending the armed hostilities between Russia and Ukraine is finally on the table. The devil will be in the details, with three core aspects front and center in the negotiations.
First is where to draw the line.
Russia will likely insist upon keeping the eastern Ukrainian oblasts it has already conquered and illegitimately folded into the Russian state, potentially in addition to the Crimean Peninsula with its significant naval strategic advantages.
Vladimir Putin may negotiate harder than this, given that merely assuming the oblasts would provide no natural defensive advantage, being largely open plains. The Russian president may open negotiations by insisting on all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper River, a more defensible line that provides space between Russian population centers and the democratic West.
But this should be treated as a non-starter by Trump and Zelensky: It would put the new borders of the Russian state right on Kyiv’s doorstep. In drawing new boundaries, Trump and Zelensky need to be strong and strategic, resisting the temptation to end the war at too high a price.
Second, Trump and Zelensky need to make the right deal for Ukrainian security guarantees going forward. In short, Ukraine needs immediate accession to NATO membership as part of any agreement to give up land to Russia.
There are clear and empirical reasons for this.
Russia has invaded a range of its “near-abroad” neighbors in recent decades, from Georgia to Moldova to Ukraine. What they all have in common is no membership in NATO. This proves the deterrence value that NATO membership provides has thus far been iron clad.
The world recently saw two scenarios — in sovereign Ukraine’s east and in China’s illegal take-over of semi-autonomous and liberal Hong Kong — in which security guarantees lacking NATO’s collective defense clause are seen by expansionist dictators for what they are: useless.
Third is the matter of who will pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction. While the lessons of the World War I armistice, which impoverished Germany for a generation and helped make Hitler’s case for World War II, should not be lost, neither should the basic principles of justice.
Russia has billions in immobilized or “frozen” financial assets abroad, some of which should be permanently seized and then redeployed to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. Estimates by the German Marshall Fund suggest the reconstruction of Ukraine will cost a total of nearly half a trillion dollars.
By injecting major non-dilutive capital into Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts, the Democratic West could super-charge the restoration and renovation of one of Europe’s most promising and strategic economies for the long term. Ukraine possesses some of the richest critical mineral deposits and agricultural resources on the planet, all of which should feed the democratic community’s strength and economic ecosystem going forward, particularly as the West’s resource war with the China-Russia-Iran axis continues to take shape.
Former President John F. Kennedy was right when he said that nations “should never negotiate out of fear, but should never fear to negotiate.” The chance for peace in Ukraine shouldn’t be brushed off lightly, but neither should justice be forgotten or an unstable peace be bought at an exorbitant price. If Putin tries to take too much land, refuses to allow a NATO security guarantee to remaining Ukrainian territory, or prefers war to the loss of frozen assets, the cost of such a peace may be too high.
Matthew Bondy is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and a contributor to the Center for North American Prosperity and Security.