Support for the democratic opposition to Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro is among the few international policy matters that have unified Democrats and Republicans in recent years, and it is imperative to maintain that consensus as a new administration assumes power in Washington. The parties might disagree on the particulars of policy toward Venezuela, but there is no path to restoring democracy there that doesn’t keep the internal opposition in the lead. It is not certain, however, that the Trump administration’s approach to Venezuela will prioritize the promotion of democracy, let alone sustain the country’s opposition as the principal protagonists in the effort. On the one hand, the selection of two vocal Florida critics of Maduro – Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) for secretary of State and Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) as national security advisor — has raised expectations of a return to the so-called maximum pressure policy of Donald Trump’s first term and tightening of economic sanctions intended to trigger the collapse of the Maduro regime. Maduro, however, hopes he could reach a deal with Trump in which Venezuela accepts the return of undocumented migrants in exchange for maintaining licenses for U.S. and foreign oil companies to operate in the country — without having to make concessions linked to his stealing the presidential election in July.   Maduro’s expectations have likely been heightened following Trump’s appointment of Ric Grenell to serve as presidential envoy for special missions to work on Venezuela, among other matters.  Shortly before the 2020 election, then-President Trump dispatched Grenell, his former ambassador to Germany and director of national intelligence, and Blackwater security firm founder Erik Prince to negotiate with a Maduro envoy in Mexico City. The encounter led the Venezuelan leadership to believe an accommodation with Trump was possible. While that episode and Trump’s history of expressing admiration for authoritarians and trying to overturn his own election loss may make a deal with Maduro seem palatable to the incoming president, any agreement that fails to account for the landslide election victory over Maduro of Edmundo Gonzalez, the opposition standard bearer, should generate bipartisan resistance in Congress and dissent within the new administration.  Policymakers familiar with Venezuela recognize that the only way to curb illegal migration from the country, as well as reduce the presence there of hostile powers like China, Russia and Iran and end its role as a hub for drug trafficking and other transnational criminality, is through the establishment of a government that respects human rights and creates a more favorable economic environment. The precise mix and sequencing of pressure and inducements that would have the highest likelihood of success is subject to legitimate debate, and anyone involved in Venezuela policy in recent years should approach the issue with humility.  Trump’s sanctions-based policy in his first term left the Venezuelan people poorer, the opposition weaker, and Maduro further ensconced in power, thereby spurring greater migration.  The Biden administration’s emphasis on diplomacy and economic inducements allowed for the July election to proceed and the opposition to expose Maduro’s illegitimacy, though the policy has thus far failed to dislodge the dictator. This history underlines the United States’s limited ability to alter the autocratic behavior of Maduro’s regime and could provide fodder to Trump to de-emphasize democracy promotion, but it does not mean the United States should abandon the goal. Washington can still help advance democracy in Venezuela by pairing diplomatic initiatives with efforts to bolster the internal opposition.  Among the reasons Trump’s first-term Venezuela policy failed was that the recognition of National Assembly head and opposition leader Juan Guaidó as president in 2019 and other steps to diplomatically isolate and economically weaken the regime were not matched by sufficient internal political pressure on the government. Achieving that today is no easy task either of course. The Venezuelan opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado, has already done more than anyone could have expected. After Machado, the winner of last year’s opposition presidential primary, was unconstitutionally banned from running, she and the country’s democratic leadership aligned behind Gonzalez’s candidacy.  Despite an unfair and repressive political environment, Gonzalez won by about 2 to 1. The regime fabricated results, declared Maduro the victor, and then unleashed a wave of repression, jailing opposition supporters, coercing Gonzalez into exile and compelling Machado to go into hiding. Today, Venezuelans are fearful and disinclined to protest in person, but still hopeful Gonzalez will be inaugurated as the country’s rightful president when Maduro’s current term ends on Jan. 10, 2025. And opposition leaders have not given up on inducing the regime to negotiate a democratic transition by offering incentives, including some form of amnesty for certain crimes. But democracy activists need international support to intensify public pressure on the regime from within Venezuela. Foreign governments and international organizations can help get political prisoners released, allow Machado and other leaders to operate in the open, and maintain opposition unity, as well as increase access to reporting by independent journalists and employ creative organizational techniques used by successful democratic movements in other authoritarian countries.   Such efforts would have to be carried out with special care given a new Venezuela law regulating non-governmental organizations intended to restrict support for civil society. In spite of such pressure, many courageous Venezuelans are prepared to stay engaged in the battle for democracy and human rights from within Venezuela. The United States can help if it reinforces their role. Mark Feierstein, a senior advisor with Albright Stonebridge Group, was special assistant to President Obama and senior director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the National Security Council.