The Spurs need to be more like Fabius than Hannibal, for now Ah, the Fall. That russet time of year when a young man’s fancies turn from coastal recreation to biergartens, basketball, and the battles of Rome’s 2nd Punic War. I know you’ve all been on the edge of your seats wondering how we could apply the lessons of Roman imperial conquest to the sport of professional basketball. After all, men think about the Roman Empire every day it seems. And that’s just half the population. In the past you’ve asked us so many times (realistically, not even once) why our content doesn’t feature more practical and strategic guidance from classical history. Never fear. That’s what we do here at Pounding the Rock; catering to your every sporting (and historical) need. Your cries have not gone unheeded. But first, allow me to quickly sum up most of the Spurs’ offseason: The Spurs signed Chris Paul and drafted Stephon Castle. In theory, this gives them enough depth to have a player who has actually played point guard running the point at all times. The Spurs traded for Harrison Barnes, which adds another player who can reliably convert from long distance and play solid defense. However, they did not retain Cedi Osman, so this largely profiles as a wash depth-wise for shooting. The Spurs did not draft or acquire another backup big man. Should the fierce-yet-frangible Zach Collins again sustain an injury of any length, they will again find themselves very thin at the 5. I mention these points not as condemnation of San Antonio’s off-season, but rather as points of legitimate concern. And largely, to tamp down some of the loftier team/season expectations that I’ve seen circulating about the interwebs. What does any of this have to do with ancient Rome, you ask? Specifically, not a damn thing. Symbolically, though? Well, let’s see just how far I can stretch this metaphor. When Hannibal and his elephants emerged from the base of the Alps in northern Italy, in the early winter of 218 BC, it sent a shockwave though the world at the time. It’s not hard to imagine why. By this time the Roman Republic was both well established, and still aggressively expanding. Powerfully on the rise, Rome had won the fear and admiration of neighboring countries. Their military might was already considerable and surprising them was something that simply wasn’t done. That Hannibal had attempted (and succeeded) in crossing an entire army across the Alps in the winter was impressive enough. That he had caught the Romans off guard and invaded their homeland was unthinkable. (Imagine being a rural Roman guard on watch and witnessing the first elephant you’ve ever seen emerging from the backdrop of a snowy mountain range) For their part, the Romans were understandably peeved by this development. They had intended to spend the spring building up an invading force with the intent of conquering Hannibal’s native Carthage. To say that this put a bit of a hitch in their plans would be quite the understatement. Additionally, the Romans were unusually disorganized militarily. Seeing as it was customary to send their troops home to winter quarters, their armies were largely unassembled and unprepared to wage war, much less defend an invasion taking place on their own ground. As a result, Hannibal gained ground quickly, winning a series of victories, as well as additional fighting men from tribes previously conquered by the Romans. His army swelled as Rome’s generals did their best to hastily assemble armies to meet him on the battlefield. One by one Hannibal decimated the assembled forces, either by superior numbers and maneuverability or through ambushes and the shrewd provocation of an arrogant and self-assured Roman military command. With panic reaching a fever-pitch, and Hannibal rapidly advancing on the gates of Rome, the senate elected to appoint a temporary dictator — a time-honored tradition in times of crisis. Their selection? A former two-time consul of Rome, Quintus Fabius Maximus. Their choice of Fabius Maximus was equal parts desperate and amusing. Long considered to be mild of temper and slow of speech, Fabius was well-respected when it came to more administrative governing matters. He was known for his prudence rather than his passions and this was something that was considered a relative weakness in the military sense. He had, in fact, already advised the senate and Rome’s generals to take a more defensive approach when dealing with Hannibal’s forces. Observing and studying each mounting defeat, he became more and more certain of both Hannibal’s military prowess and the soundness of his more cautious strategy. Upon taking charge of what remained of Rome’s forces, Fabius split the army up into smaller units and deployed a tactic we now more commonly refer to as guerrilla warfare. He ordered Rome’s forces to attack the fringes of Hannibal’s army, to retreat after inflicting damage, and only fully engage when in the hills and mountains, and when sure of numerical advantage. And most of all he ordered them to destroy any crops near Hannibal’s men and to attack his supply lines whenever able. As a result, the Romans began to win small but disruptive victories. Hannibal was unable to set up the entrenchments and supply lines necessary for a siege of Rome. And, little by little, Hannibal’s non-Carthaginian soldiers began to desert and return to their homes. With no primary Roman legions to oppose, and his forces decreasing, Hannibal’s remaining army was rendered a non-threat as Rome rebuilt their military, unable to lay siege to their capital, or even advance without threat to his supply lines. With the time they were able to carve out, Rome was able to raise over a dozen legions (100,000+ men), and in 205 BC Publius Cornelius Scipio (also known as Scipio Africanus) was given command of an army of volunteers, which in a karmic twist he then used to invade Carthage and lay waste to their crops, supplies, and cities. After 13 years of occupying Italy, Hannibal was forced to sail back to Carthage empty-handed. Two years later he suffered his only significant defeat in battle to the Romans at the Battle of Zama. Carthage had fallen. The war was over. And Rome had announced itself as the dominant world power of the time. And what does that have to do with the San Antonio Spurs, 2000+ years and 5,834 miles separated from the 2nd Punic War? In some ways, everything. The Spurs are Rome in this metaphor. Well-established winners not yet vaulted to the lofty heights of the Celtics and Lakers. There can be no question that the Spurs have spent most of the last 25 years making their mark on NBA history. Currently, however, they stand at a precipice. Recently gifted a youthful and still-developing basketball demigod, there are decisions still to be made, and courses still to be charted. Opinions on the subject of Victor Wembanyama and the Spurs’ entwined futures are sharply divided. Should the Spurs make more aggressive moves now, in an attempt to strike gold early and often, and make the most of his still-reasonable rookie contract and youthful body? Or should the Spurs slow-play this, and continue to build gradually, hoping to peak longer and more sustainably in the future? It’s a fair question, and one not easily solved by looking into the career of Timothy Theodore Duncan and San Antonio’s recent past. I suggest we go back much, much further, and ask ourselves, what would Quintus Fabius Maximus do? It was Fabius after all who would set the stage for one of Rome greatest victories, on the doorstep of what could have been their greatest defeat. It’s easy not to know that it was that very strategy (today known to militaries everywhere as the Fabian Strategy) that earned the scorn and mockery of the Roman populace, generals, and politicians of the time. ‘Cunctator’ they dubbed Fabius Maximus (still one of the hardest military nicknames of all time) – ‘The Delayer’, convinced that he had lost his stomach for conflict in spite of the brilliant military victories he’d won in his youth; that he’d forgotten how to win. As time went on they accused him of inactivity, of cowardice, and eventually, of treasonous conduct. All the while Fabius calmly bolstered and rebuilt the military, outlasting the aggression and recklessness of his fellow generals and political opponents, and eventually Hannibal himself. If any of this sounds familiar, even recent, or is drawing up the figure of an aging silhouette, there’s probably a reason why. Beyond this year there’s a real question of what to do with the Silver and Black’s mound of twinkling assets. At some point, as in the case of the 2nd Punic War, the Spurs will have to make an aggressive move, will have to give command over to their own Scipio Africanus, will have to invade Carthage. For now though, it’s best to strategically delay. Led by shrewd new on-court generals, and an aging but still canny high command, the Spurs will have to pick their spots this season. They cannot afford to lose the way that they have in past years. They’ll have to adapt to newer strategies and a changing landscape and learn how to maximize their numbers to win against the odds and superior forces. There’s still so much to learn as a unit – as a team. Their victories will be narrow, and quiet, and less than overwhelming. There will likely be an overriding sense that they’re just biding time. There will undoubtedly be unrest in the general populace and from exterior critics. For at least this year though, the path to long-term victory is clear. As in the case of Rome, time will be the undoing of their opposition, and the renewal of the Spurs’ strength. Reinforcement is coming, legions await. By the end of Fabius Maximus’ term as dictator, the tides had turned, both on the battlefield and at home. Rome’s preservation at the hands of his highly unpopular strategy was proof of his brilliance, and the nickname ‘Cunctator’ became an honorific title among the people of Rome. Fabius would be elected consul three more times, was reserved a permanent seat in government after leaving office, and spent the rest of his days referred to as ‘The Shield of Rome’. He fell ill and died before the official end of the war, shortly after Hannibal sailed away from the shores of Italy. Per legend, his tomb bore the inscription: unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem – “one man, by delaying, restored the state to us.” As the Romans themselves acknowledged, heroism and brilliance take many forms. Time has a way of opening most eyes. I wonder what things Spurs fans will see clearly 15 years from now. Playing You Out – The Theme Song of the Season: Rome Wasn’t Built In A Day by Sam Cooke Author/Editor’s Note: This article was partially inspired by James Hansen’s excellent piece for SBNation’s SLC Dunk.